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Decision Markets With Good Incentives ?
Yiling Chen, Ian Kash, Mike Ruberry and Victor Shnayder
Harvard University
Abstract. Decision markets both predict and decide the future. They
allow experts to predict the effects of each of a set of possible actions, and
after reviewing these predictions a decision maker selects an action to
perform. When the future is independent of the market, strictly proper
scoring rules myopically incentivize experts to predict consistent with
their beliefs, but this is not generally true when a decision is to be made.
When deciding, only predictions for the chosen action can be evaluated
for their accuracy since the other predictions become counterfactuals.
This limitation can make some actions more valuable than others for
an expert, incentivizing the expert to mislead the decision maker. We
construct and characterize decision markets that are – like prediction
markets using strictly proper scoring rules – myopic incentive compati-
ble. These markets require the decision maker always risk taking every
available action, and reducing this risk increases the decision maker’s
worst-case loss. We also show a correspondence between strictly proper
decision markets and strictly proper sets of prediction markets, creating
a formal connection between the incentives of prediction and decision
markets.
1 Introduction
To make an informed decision a decision maker must understand the likely conse-
quences of their actions. Hanson proposed a “decision market” to directly predict
these consequences [11]. His proposal consists of a set of conditional prediction
markets, one for each possible action. After the markets close the decision maker
could evaluate each action’s predicted effect on the set of possible outcomes, and
choose the most preferred action. Conditional markets for actions not taken are
voided.
Consider, for example, a project manager deciding between two developers,
A and B. The manager prefers to hire the candidate more likely to complete a
project on time, so it runs two conditional prediction markets. One determines
the likelihood A will finish on time, conditional on A being hired, and the latter
does the same for B. If the project manager has access to knowledgeable experts
and these markets reflect the experts’ information then the manager can make
an informed hiring decision.
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Using a prediction market to make a decision is natural and previous work has
demonstrated they can produce accurate forecasts [1,2,18,3,8]. However, while a
prediction market using a strictly proper scoring rule is myopic incentive compat-
ible, Hanson’s proposed decision market is not. That is, in a prediction market
an expert maximizes its score for a prediction by predicting consistent with its
beliefs, but the same is not true when a decision is to be made [16,6].
We return to our hypothetical project manager and the design of its two
prediction markets. The manager would like to reward experts for improving
either market’s accuracy, but only one market’s condition will ever be realized
since only one developer will be hired. The other market’s predictions will become
unscored counterfactuals. If an expert has improved one market’s prediction
more than the other’s, it has an incentive to convince the project manager to
hire the associated developer regardless of how poor an employee that developer
may be!
More concretely, if the markets currently predict developer A has a 60%
and developer B a 80% chance of finishing the project on time, and an expert
believes the correct likelihoods are 70% and 80%, respectively, truthful reporting
can only improve the market’s accuracy for developer A. If developer B is hired
this expert will receive a score of zero, but if A is hired they expect to score for
a 10% improvement. Instead of being honest, then, the expert can pretend B is
incompetent, lowering the market’s prediction for the likelihood B will finish on
time to less than 70%, cause A to be hired instead, and enjoy the profits.
We address this manipulation and construct and characterize decision mar-
kets that are myopic incentive compatible, like prediction markets. Instead of a
scoring rule, these markets use a decision scoring rule that can account for the
likelihood actions are taken when scoring predictions. When a decision maker
risks taking an action at random, these decision scoring rules allow the scores
of unlikely actions to be amplified while the scores of likely actions are com-
paratively reduced, making risk neutral experts indifferent to their affect on the
decision. We show this risk of taking an action at random is a requirement for
myopic incentive compatible decision markets, and reducing this risk increases
the decision maker’s worst-case loss. We also show that, for risk-neutral experts,
every myopic incentive compatible decision market describes a game equivalent
to that described by a myopic incentive compatible set of prediction markets,
creating a formal connection between decision and prediction markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 describes previous
work on prediction and decision markets. Section 2 provides a formal descrip-
tion of prediction markets in our notation, and Section 3 describes our decision
market model. Section 4 presents our construction and characterization results.
Section 5 extends these results, describing optimal behavior for a risk neutral de-
cision maker and connecting prediction and decision markets. Finally, Section 6
discusses further research challenges and concludes.
1.1 Related work
Strictly proper scoring rules have long been understood to be able to truthfully
elicit a single risk-neutral expert’s beliefs over the outcome of an uncertain event
[14,17,10]. Hanson [12,13] showed these same rules could be used to myopically
incentivize any number of experts to be honest in a prediction market, and
described an extension of scoring rules – market scoring rules – that prevent
the market maker’s worst-case loss from growing with the number of experts.
Importantly, all strictly proper scoring rules require the market maker correctly
observe the event’s outcome. We formally describe these rules in Section 2.
When making a decision, some outcomes are not observed, and strictly proper
scoring rules do not generally myopically incentivize an expert to be truthful.
Othman and Sandholm [16] first formalized this incentive problem. They consid-
ered a single expert predicting and a decision maker picking their most preferred
action based on the expert’s predictions, and they showed the expert can be in-
centivized to honestly reveal the decision maker’s most preferred action. They
describe this decision rule as max—simply picking the best action from what’s
available. Chen and Kash [6] also considered a single expert but allowed both de-
terministic and stochastic decision rules. Given a decision rule they characterized
all scoring rules incentivizing a single risk-neutral expert to predict truthfully.
But while strictly proper scoring rules can be used for a single expert and
extend to prediction markets, these scoring and decision pairs do not have a such
a natural extension . In a prediction market, an expert’s expected score for a
prediction is fixed once the prediction is made, and the same is true when a single
expert is informing a decision. In a decision market, however, a prediction’s score
may not be fixed until the market closes, creating new strategic complexities.
In fact, Othman and Sandholm showed that no scoring rule can myopically
incentivize experts to predict honestly in a decision market using their max
rule, and we extend this result in Section 4. We also describe myopic incentive
compatible decision markets for the first time.
Recently, manipulation in the presence of outside incentives has been studied
[9,5]. In this paper we do not consider outside payoffs. The decision maker’s
choice of action may affect an expert’s utility, but not because of any inherent
preferences over actions that expert may have.
2 Prediction Markets: Background and Notation
This section presents the standard market scoring rule model of a prediction
market, first described by Hanson [12,13], and defines our notation.
Let O be a finite, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive set of outcomes. A
prediction market is a sequential game played by any number of risk-neutral,
expected-value–maximizing experts predicting the likelihood of these outcomes.
The market opens at round zero with some initial prediction p0 ∈ ∆(O), where
∆(O) is the set of probability distribution over outcomes. At each round after
the market opens, an arbitrarily chosen expert makes a prediction p ∈ ∆(O),
and we let pt be the prediction made in round t. The market closes at some
round t¯, after which an outcome o∗ is observed and experts are scored for each
prediction by a scoring rule,
s : O ×∆(O)→ R ∪ {−∞},
where R is the set of real numbers. We write so(p) ≡ s(o, p) as a shorthand, and
an expert’s payment for a prediction is the difference between the scores of its
and the immediately preceding prediction. Letting T be the set of rounds when
an expert made a prediction, its total payoff is∑
t∈T
so∗(p
t)− so∗(pt−1).
Markets with this sequential difference payoff structure are described as market
scoring rule markets.
Scoring rules are regular when only predictions assigning zero likelihood to
the observed event are scored negative infinity, and proper when a risk-neutral
expert’s expected score for a prediction is maximized when predicting consistent
with its belief. Formally, a rule is proper if for all beliefs q ∈ ∆(O) over the
likelihood of outcomes and predictions p∑
o∈O
qoso(q) ≥
∑
o∈O
qoso(p),
where qo is the believed likelihood of outcome o. A rule is strictly proper when the
inequality is strict unless q = p, uniquely maximizing an expert’s score when they
predict consistent with their beliefs. An example of a strictly proper scoring rule
is so(p) = ao + b log po with ao ∈ R and b > 0. When experts uniquely maximize
their score for a prediction by predicting consistent with their beliefs we describe
the mechanism as myopically incentive compatible.
In aggregate, experts receive a payoff of Σ t¯t=1so∗(p
t)− so∗(pt−1) = so∗(pt¯)−
so∗(p
0), so the market institution’s worst-case loss is
max
o∗,pt¯
so∗(p
0)− so∗(pt¯).
Note that the market institution’s payment is bounded and independent of the
number of experts. In practice, a market institution’s budget must be at least
their worst-case loss.
Ideally, the final prediction is an accurate consensus of experts’ beliefs. Bayesian
experts, for example, update their beliefs as they observe other’s predictions.
However, while a market using a strictly proper scoring rule is myopic incentive
compatible, it is not incentive compatible in general. An expert participating
in multiple rounds may provide a prediction inconsistent with its belief, with
the intention to mislead other experts and later capitalize on their mistakes [4].
Despite such possible manipulations by forward-looking Bayesian experts, pre-
vious work has shown that under certain conditions prediction markets that are
myopic incentive compatible can fully aggregate information in finite rounds [4]
or in the limit [15]. In this paper, however, we do not restrict experts to be
Bayesian but allow arbitrary – or free – beliefs, as is typical when working with
scoring rules.
3 Decision Market Model
A prediction market is a special case of a decision market. Both use the same
sequential market structure, but a decision market uses a decision rule to pick
from a set of actions before the outcome is observed, and which action is chosen
may affect the likelihood an outcome occurs. Unlike previously proposed models
of decision markets, we score experts using a decision scoring rule instead of a
standard scoring rule. This more general function is necessary to recreate the
myopic incentive compatibility of a prediction market for the broadest possible
class of decision markets.
Let A be a finite set of actions, and O a set of outcomes as before. Without
loss of generality and for notational convenience we assume the outcomes for
every action are the same. As in a prediction market, a decision market opens
with an initial prediction, but instead of a single probability distribution it is
a set of conditional distributions, one for each action, denoted P 0 ∈ ∆(O)|A|.
Experts still report sequentially, and we let P t be the prediction made in round
t, P ta that prediction’s distribution over outcomes given action a is chosen, and
P ta,o be that conditional distribution’s likelihood for outcome o.
After the market closes, the decision maker selects an action using a decision
rule
D : ∆(O)|A| → ∆(A),
applied to the final report P t¯, drawing an action a∗ from A according to the
distribution D(P t¯). We say that a decision rule has full support if it only maps
to distributions with full support. As a shorthand we write d for a distribution
over actions and da the likelihood action a is drawn from the set.
Once the action is selected, an outcome o∗ is revealed, and experts are scored
for each prediction by a decision scoring rule
S : A×O ×∆(A)×∆(O)|A| → R ∪ {−∞},
written Sa,o(d, P ) ≡ S(a, o, d, P ). Paralleling scoring rules, we describe decision
scoring rules as regular when only predictions assigning zero likelihood to the
observed event are scored negative infinity.
Letting T again be rounds where an expert made a prediction, its total payoff
is ∑
t∈T
Sa∗,o∗(d, P
t)− Sa∗,o∗(d, P t−1),
so the market institution’s worst-case loss is
max
P t¯,a∈A¯,o∈O
Sa,o(d, P
0)− Sa,o(d, P t¯), (1)
where A¯ is the support of D(P t¯). Previous work on decision markets used a
similar model, but with a conditional scoring rule
sc : A×O ×∆(O)|A| → R ∪ {−∞},
instead of a decision scoring rule.
As we show in the next section, however, considering the likelihood an action
is selected is necessary to create the same myopic incentive compatibility as in
prediction markets.
4 Decision Market Incentives
In a prediction market, a strictly proper scoring rule uniquely maximizes an
expert’s score for a prediction when they predict consistent with their beliefs.
The same is not always true in a decision market. While both markets can reward
improvements over a prior prediction, a decision market only observes and scores
the improvement in the prediction for the chosen action. Since this action is a
function of the market’s final prediction, experts may have an incentive to change
this prediction (either directly or by manipulating other experts) to create a
distribution over actions more likely to score their greatest improvement.
In this section we extend the myopic incentives of prediction markets to
decision markets, demonstrating how to construct myopic incentive compatible
decision markets, and characterizing some of their properties. While myopic
incentive compatibility does not guarantee that an expert who participates in
multiple rounds will predict consistent with its beliefs in every round, previous
work has shown that myopic incentives are sufficient to aggregate experts’ private
information at perfect Bayesian equilibria under certain conditions [4,15].
4.1 Myopic Incentive Compatibility
We first provide a formal treatment of myopic incentive compatibility for de-
cision markets. Recall, for a prediction market, myopic incentive compatibility
requires an expert always maximize their score for a prediction when they pre-
dict consistent with their beliefs. Assume a decision market uses decision rule D
and decision scoring rule S. Then an expert with beliefs Q over the conditional
outcomes who expects that d will be the final distribution over actions has an
expected score for a prediction P of∑
a∈A
da
∑
o∈O
Qa,oSa,o(d, P ).
And a myopic incentive compatible decision market must account not only for
an expert’s prediction, but also the likelihood each action is taken.
Definition 1. A decision market (D,S) with a regular decision scoring rule S
is proper if ∑
a∈A
da
∑
o∈O
Qa,oSa,o(d,Q) ≥
∑
a∈A
d′a
∑
o∈O
Qa,oSa,o(d
′, P ),
for all beliefs Q, distributions d and d′ in the codomain of D and predictions P .
The market is strictly proper if the inequality is strict unless P = Q.
If the market is strictly proper we also describe it as myopic incentive compat-
ible, analogous to our treatment of prediction markets. When a decision market
is not strictly proper there exist final predictions and beliefs such that experts
maximize their score for a prediction by misrepresenting their beliefs.
4.2 A Simple Construction For Strictly Proper Decision Markets
Given a decision rule with full support, a simple construction can extend any
strictly proper scoring rule into a decision scoring rule that makes the resulting
decision market strictly proper, too.
Theorem 1. Let D be a decision rule with full support. Then there exists a
decision scoring rule S such that (D,S) is strictly proper.
Proof. The proof is by construction. Let s be any strictly proper scoring rule.
Construct
Sa,o(d, P ) =
1
da
so(Pa). (2)
(D,S) is strictly proper: an expert’s expected score for a prediction is∑
a∈A
da
∑
o∈O
Qa,o
1
da
so(Pa) =
∑
a∈A
∑
o∈O
Qa,oso(Pa),
the sum of the expected scores of the same prediction in a set of prediction
markets, one for each action, using a strictly proper scoring rule. Since predicting
consistent with beliefs maximizes the expected score of the expert in each market,
it maximizes the sum of the expected scores. 
This constructive result positively answers Chen and Kash’s open question
whether it is possible to construct decision markets with good incentives [6].
4.3 Strictly Proper Decision Markets Have Full Support
The construction in Theorem 1 requires a decision rule have full support, and
makes experts’ expected scores independent of future reports while their actual
scores vary inversely with the likelihood an action is chosen. Surprisingly, every
strictly proper decision market with a differentiable decision scoring rule has
these properties. We prove the necessity of full support before characterizing all
strictly proper decision market with differentiable decision scoring rules.
Theorem 2. Let D be a decision rule. A decision scoring rule S that makes
(D,S) strictly proper exists if and only if D has full support.
Proof. First we prove that if a decision rule D does not have full support, there
is no decision scoring rule S such that (D,S) is strictly proper. We proceed by
contradiction. Let D be a decision rule without full support, choose a final report
P so that d = D(P ) has dk = 0 for some k ∈ A, and let S be a decision scoring
rule such that (D,S) is strictly proper. Let Q,Q′ ∈ ∆(O)|A| be two beliefs
differing only on action k: for all a 6= k and all o, Qa,o = Q′a,o;∃o Qk,o 6= Q′k,o.
Consider the expected utility of an expert with each of these beliefs reporting
truthfully, while the final report remains P . One of these utilities must be weakly
greater than the other. Without loss of generality, let∑
a∈A
∑
o∈O
daQa,oSa,o(d,Q) ≥
∑
a∈A
∑
o∈O
daQ
′
a,oSa,o(d,Q
′), (3)
Because Q and Q′ only differ on action k, and dk = 0,∑
a∈A
∑
o∈O
daQa,oSa,o(d,Q) =
∑
a∈A
∑
o∈O
daQ
′
a,oSa,o(d,Q), (4)
Combining lines (3) and (4) contradicts strict properness with respect to Q′.
The other direction, which shows how to construct a strictly proper decision
market for any decision rule with full support, follows by the construction in the
proof of Theorem 1. 
This result extends Othman and Sandholm’s impossibility result for deter-
ministic decision markets [16] to the more general class of decision markets with-
out full support. The theorem does not apply to non-strictly proper decision
markets, however; for example, all constant decision scoring rules are proper for
all decision rules.
4.4 Decision Markets With Good Incentives
While Theorem 1 provided a simple construction to create a strictly proper
decision market, we now characterize all strictly proper decision and decision
scoring rule pairs. The proof of Theorem 3 parallels similar characterizations of
proper scoring rules given by Gneiting and Raftery [10] and of strictly proper
pairs for a single expert [6], and appears in the full version of the paper1.
Theorem 3. A decision market (D,S), where S is regular and D has full sup-
port, is (strictly) proper if
Sa,o(d, P ) =
1
da|A|
(
G(P )−G′(P ) : P + |A|G′a,o(P )
)
(5)
where G : ∆(O)|A| → R is a (strictly) convex function, G′(P ) is a subgradient
of G at P and : denotes the Frobenius inner product. Conversely, if S is differ-
entiable in P and (D,S) is (strictly) proper, then S can be written in the form
of (5) for some (strictly) convex G.
1 Available from the authors’ personal webpages.
Like the construction of Theorem 1, the characterization shown in Theorem 3
requires an expert’s expected score to be independent of the final report, and
that the realized score vary inversely with the likelihood an action is taken. It
does, however, allow more complicated constructions than the normalized strictly
proper scoring rules used in Theorem 1. For example, given a decision rule D
with full support, defining
Sa,o(d, P ) =
1
da|A| (2|A|Pa,o −
∑
i,j
P 2i,j), (6)
makes (D,S) a strictly proper decision market.
Theorem 3 also illustrates that our expansion of the payment rule in decision
markets from scoring rules to decision scoring rules is necessary to obtain myopic
incentive compatibility, because scoring rules do not allow a dependence on d.
Scoring rules function properly in the special case of a prediction market because
for any constant decision rule a strictly proper scoring rule is sufficient to create
myopic incentive compatibility.
5 Extensions
In this section we discuss how a decision maker can approximate a deterministic
rule, and what the optimal decision rule for a risk-neutral decision maker would
be. We also demonstrate a correspondence between any strictly proper decision
market and a set of strictly proper prediction markets, suggesting a framework
for applying previous prediction market results to decision markets.
5.1 Approximating Deterministic Decisions
Deterministic decision rules, like max, are natural. Unfortunately, no strictly
proper decision market can use a deterministic decision rule. It is possible, how-
ever, to approximate deterministic decision rules with stochastic ones, but bet-
ter approximations of a deterministic decision rule increase the decision maker’s
worst case loss.
Corollary 1. Every strictly proper decision market (D,S) where
infP∈∆(O)|A| Da(P ) = 0 for some action a has unbounded worst-case loss.
We omit the proof as it follows directly from the inverse relationship between
scores and the likelihood of actions required by Theorem 3.
5.2 Expected Utility Maximizing Decision Rules
A natural question is how a decision maker should design a strictly proper deci-
sion market to maximize their expected utility. A decision maker’s utility is the
payoff they receive for the observed outcome minus the cost of paying experts.
Since the expected payment to experts is independent of the decision rule used,
an expected utility maximizing decision rule maximizes the likelihood the most
preferred action is taken, subject to the decision maker’s budget constraint. We
call this decision rule approx-max, and since picking a decision scoring rule is
analogous to picking a scoring rule for a prediction market, we take it as given
when defining the decision rule.
Given a budget b and decision scoring rule S, and the final reports P t¯, we
compute a minimal feasible probability for each action a,
pa = max
o
Sa,o([1]
|a|, P t¯)− Sa,o([1]|a|, P 0)
b
,
where [1]|a| is a vector of ones. This expression computes the decision maker’s
worst-case payment to experts for each action, unweighted, then divides that
value by the budget to find a feasible inverse multiplier for the decision scoring
rule, which is equal to the minimal feasible probability. If
∑
a∈A pa > 1 then no
decision rule fits the decision maker’s budget, but otherwise a “probability sur-
plus” of 1−∑a∈A pa can be assigned arbitrarily. approx-max adds this surplus
to the minimal feasible probability of the most preferred action to maximize the
decision maker’s expected utility.
5.3 A Correspondence Between Decision Markets and Prediction
Markets
Strictly proper decision markets constructed using the technique in Theorem 1
have an expected score for a prediction P , given beliefs Q, of∑
a∈A
∑
o∈O
Qa,oso(Pa),
where s is a strictly proper scoring rule. This is also equal to an expert’s expected
score for a set of predictions in a set of independent prediction markets, one for
each action in A. This equivalence holds more generally: every strictly proper
decision market has a corresponding set of prediction markets. Theorem 4 states
this correspondence formally.
Theorem 4. Every strictly proper decision market (D,S), where S is differen-
tiable, has a corresponding strictly proper set of prediction markets. This corre-
spondence implies that when the previous prediction in both settings is the same,
the expected score for a new prediction, given any beliefs, is also the same.
Informally, this theorem implies risk-neutral experts are indifferent to partic-
ipating in a strictly proper decision market or the corresponding set of strictly
proper prediction markets. Their available predictions and expected scores for
each prediction are the same in both settings. This correspondence suggests that
results applying to sets of prediction markets may also apply directly to decision
markets.
6 Conclusion
We extended the myopic incentive compatibility of prediction markets to decision
markets. We proved that this extension requires the decision maker use a decision
rule with full support, and showed how to construct a strictly proper decision
market for any such decision rule, answering an open question posed by Chen
and Kash [6]. We characterized the set of myopic incentive compatible decision
markets, and show that it is possible to approximate any deterministic decision
rule with a stochastic decision rule, although better approximations cause higher
worst-case loss for the decision maker. We also showed a correspondence between
strictly proper decision and sets of prediction markets, suggesting a unifying
technique to apply results to both types of markets.
There remain many interesting research questions involving decision mar-
kets. Requiring decision makers commit to a randomized decision rule poses an
important practical challenge. Returning to our example from the introduction,
the project manager must be willing to risk hiring a slower developer for the
privilege of running a myopic incentive compatible decision market. This is sim-
ply not credible behavior—managers prefer to hire faster developers. Designing
a more credible mechanism is likely to be a prerequisite for the deployment of
decision markets in practice.
Another practical concern is extending our decision market results to a cost
function framework. Instead of requiring experts provide an entire probability
distribution, cost function based prediction markets allow traders to buy and
sell contracts associated with particular outcomes [7]. The price of each contract
is expected to represent the likelihood that outcome occurs. These interfaces are
similar to that provided by stock markets, and there is an equivalence between
scoring rule and cost function markets. The same equivalence holds for decision
markets, but our decision scoring rules require contracts with variable payouts or
large upfront costs, both undesirable features. Designing a more natural contract
structure for a decision may be of considerable practical value.
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